INTRODUCTION
If you walk through the sundrenched spaces of the world headquarters of Airbnb, the online accommodation Platform, you will notice that there are no private offices, not even for the CEO. Instead, collaboration spaces fill the 72,000-square-foot building, many of which are literal translations of Airbnb listings around the world. 1 If you look closely, you will stumble upon an unremarkable space: a perfect replica of Joe Gebbia and Brian Chesky's apartment circa 2007. 2 It was there that the two blew up air mattresses for the first time and allowed people to pay a small fee to sleep on their floor. It was also there that they monetized their excess capacity, made rent, and birthed a $31 billion company. Airbnb provides a platform that enables a cadre of new hoteliers to access customers. But, instead of utilizing excess capacity, these "hosts" are snatching up desired spaces solely for the purpose of listing them on the site. And in many places, at least initially, they benefit from loose or absent regulations made possible by Airbnb's rhetoric. 9 This lack of regulation not only puts consumers at risk, damages the make-up of neighborhoods, and disrupts the existing accommodation industry, but it has helped Airbnb become a powerful influencer in Silicon Valley, city councils, state legislatures, and beyond. 10 As Part I of this Article explains, in addition to Airbnb, other "unicorns" 11 within the Sharing Economy 12 convince communities, regulators, and courts that they are facilitating altruistic activities that utilize excess capacity, support job growth, and alter how we consume. This Myth helps these Platforms 13 avoid everything from employment laws (by claiming supply-side 14 users are independent contractors) to liability for consumer harm (by claiming they are technology companies shielded by the Communications Decency Act). As argued in Part II, this subversion produces numerous market failures and gives the dominant players in each modality the space they need to grow strong and powerful via network effects.
Once successful, these Platforms are armed with more than the cash necessary to influence regulators and courts via lobbyists and attorneys. They are fortified with formidable legions of users. These users are encouraged, largely through Platform interfaces, to advocate on behalf of the Platforms and 9 See infra Section I.B.
10
For a complete discussion of the harms caused by Airbnb and other Sharing Economy Platforms, see infra Section II.B.
11
A "unicorn" is a startup company valued at over a billion dollars. Words We're Watching: The Billion-Dollar Unicorn, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/unicornwords-we're-watching (last visited Aug. 23, 2017). 12 As discussed in Part I, there is no doubt that the word "sharing" is a misnomer. Out of a need for a term to describe the phenomenon, this Article uses the term "Sharing Economy," and capitalizes the term to refer to all businesses that utilize platforms to connect people who have goods and services to offer with those who are willing to purchase them. It should be noted, however, that in previous scholarship, the author of this Article has defined Sharing Economy companies as companies with four key characteristics: (1) the company has an online platform; (2) that platform relies on microbusinesses to provide goods and services; (3) the goods and services offered by the microbusinesses consist of their excess capacity in their personal assets and schedules; and (4) the platform facilitates high-powered information exchange about user trustworthiness via reputation systems and other means. Abbey Stemler, Betwixt and Between: Regulating the Shared Economy, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 31, 57-63 (2016) . However, as we now can see, most successful Sharing Economy companies do not contain all four of these components (particularly excess capacity and microbusinesses). For a complete discussion of the definition, see id. 13 The capitalized word "Platform" is used throughout this article to refer to companies within the Sharing Economy.
14 "Supply-side users" are individuals who sell their excess capacity. and obligations. 17 The Article concludes by distilling key lessons for regulating future innovations and demonstrates the importance of questioning the difference between rhetoric and reality to achieve the desired ends of regulation.
I. MYTH MAKING
This Part briefly describes the initial excitement surrounding the Sharing Economy. It then exposes the elements that make up its Myth. By clearly understanding the Myth, we can begin to see how it has contributed to the under-regulation of the Sharing Economy.
A. The Honeymoon Stage
In the early 2010s, the Sharing Economy was considered a social, political, and economic transformation that was "democratizing how we produce, consume, govern, and solve social problems." 18 Many thought, and some still do, that the Sharing Economy signaled a revolution that would empower ordinary people to utilize their personal excess capacity in a variety of ways. 19 Others believed it could present a new form of the American Dream. 20 The Sharing Economy excited people, governments, and entrepreneurs around the world because it appeared to provide economic opportunities for a broad cross-section of society. 21 Many believed it allowed people to bridge the gap between permanent job opportunities and to pursue entrepreneurial endeavors and the creative arts. See Martin, supra note 16, at 153-54. 22 The U.S. Conference of Mayors in June 2013 stated, "Sharing Economy companies have proven to be engines of innovation and job creation, driving economic development in the hearts of American cities, where joblessness is still most pervasive." U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, ADOPTED RESOLUTIONS AT THE 81ST ANNUAL MEETING 187 (2013), http://iiusa.org/blog/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/resolutions-adopted.pdf. "Sharing leverages a wide variety of resources and lowers barriers to starting small businesses," with the case. For example, Airbnb reports that 45% of their hosts in Portland, Oregon are "self-employed, freelancers, or part-time workers, [and] 12% of [these] hosts . . . have used Airbnb income to support themselves while launching a new business." 23 Uber reports that 74% of its drivers do so "to help maintain a steady source of income to supplement . . . unpredictable earnings." 24 However, as described in the subsections below, there is more to the story because supply-side users either lack needed worker protections or are fullfledged businesses subverting regulations.
With regard to the environment, some thought that by tapping into excess capacity, the Sharing Economy could help save the world by allowing people to "meet the speed, scale, and local adaption requirements [necessary] to address climate change in time to prevent the catastrophic change that we've set in motion." 25 In fact 76% of adults familiar with the Sharing Economy believe it is good for the environment. 26 Presumably the Sharing Economy can reduce the need for capital-intensive infrastructure (such as hotels) and durable goods (such as cars) since the excess capacity in these spaces and goods is exploited. 27 And, because people often have a personal interaction with the owner of assets in the Sharing Economy, they tend to be more considerate when using those assets. As Airbnb reports, guests in North America consume outsourcing of tasks and "innovations like shared workspaces, shared commercial kitchens, communityfinanced start-ups, community-owned commercial centers, and spaces for 'pop-up' businesses." JANELLE ORSI ET The Sharing Economy can also address peak load problems within the transportation and accommodation industries when demand is unusually high (e.g., for a sporting event, convention, etc. While these kinds of market failures are not uncommon among burgeoning industries, what is troubling is the role rhetoric has played in convincing people that the Sharing Economy need not be regulated.
B. Elements of the Myth
In Plato's Gorgias, Gorgias defined "rhetoric" as "the art of persuasion."
36
This Article employs a similarly expansive definition of rhetoric and includes all speech used with the intent to persuade. This broad definition is necessary because rhetoric, as applied to public opinion formation, is a topic of study for a variety of disciplines (political science, psychology, communication, sociology, economics, etc.). This Article draws upon several of these disciplines, but most heavily relies on contributions from the field of political science.
37
Generally speaking, and from whatever angle, rhetoric is powerful because it can be used to shape arguments and preclude socially acceptable 28 CLEANTECH GROUP, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF HOME SHARING: PHASE 1 REPORT (2014). 29 Codagnone et al., supra note 16, at 13; see also Martin, supra note 16, at 149 (arguing that views on the Sharing Economy now tend to rest on one of two extremes: a "niche of socio-digital experiments" or a "niche . . . integrating digital technologies into socio-technical structures"). rebuttals, which can force people to endorse stances that go against their or society's best interests. 38 The use of rhetoric in the sphere of public discourse to influence public policy runs parallel to the birth of public policy itself. As historian James Burns explains, the more democratic societies become, the more important rhetoric is to convince individuals of what they should believe and whom they should follow.
39
"Leadership over human beings is exercised when persons with certain motives and purposes mobilize, in competition or conflict with others, institutional, political, psychological, and other resources so as to arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers." 40 Effective rhetoricians convince their audiences by using particular terms that cause visceral reactions in listeners and by framing arguments in precise ways. 41 If we look backward in time (although we need not go too far), we can see how disruptive and ambitious Platforms grew using the most positive and inspiring characteristics of the Sharing Economy to distort perceptions and avoid regulation. As demonstrated in the subsections below, framing and precise wording confused and overemphasized the positive aspects of the Sharing Economy and compelled the public and lawmakers to support this nascent and fast-moving industry. These two elements of rhetoric, frames and word choice, make up the Myth of the Sharing Economy. 
Word Choice
Word choice influences how people perceive issues and in turn how they feel about those issues.
43
This is why policymakers carefully leverage the power of words, and politicians often conduct research studies to determine the 38 Note that the word "myth" in this Article is used generally to indicate the powerful, consequential, and dominate discourse used by Sharing Economy Platforms. As with other terms used in this Article, such as "rhetoric" and "frames," I do not delve into their metaphysics; however, there are several sources that are helpful to appreciate the complexity of these terms. See, e.g., THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO Other areas where word choice has been used to drive regulation include the "death tax" 46 and "pro-life." 47 Invoking rhetorical tropes makes arguments accessible and colors them with shades of morality.
See generally

48
The term "Sharing Economy" is a model of how word choice can influence perceptions. Adopted by most Platforms, the term invokes notions of "helping others" and "community."
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A Pew Research study found that 40% of respondents who had heard of the term Sharing Economy and could give a classifiable description of it focused more on the sharing part of the phrase than the economy aspect. 50 Indeed, many of these participants thought of sharing literally, with individuals sharing resources in a charitable manner.
51
Others associated the term with neighborliness, "frequently using words like 'community' or 'friends' in their responses."
52
Platforms have been eager to position themselves under the Sharing Economy umbrella because of the "positive symbolic meaning of sharing, the magnetism of innovative digital technologies, and the rapidly growing volume of sharing activity." 53 As Cristiano Codagnone, Federico Biagi, and Fabienne Abadie argue, the term encompasses so many activities that it confuses the issues surrounding how to regulate the Sharing Economy because " [i] The transition in terminology from "right to life" to "pro-life" has "successfully put abortion in the frame of 'life' and not 'choice' because life holds a higher moral priority than choice. Despite the common perception, the term "Sharing Economy" is clearly a misnomer. 57 As described in further detail below, dominant companies within the Sharing Economy (Uber, Lyft, Airbnb, etc.) rarely enable sharing as it is commonly understood. Instead, cash, as opposed to altruism, motivates supplyside user behavior. It is more appropriate to classify these companies as part of the "gig economy," "peer-to-peer economy," or "on-demand economy," but these terms do not spark the positive emotions associated with sharing.
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The term "Sharing Economy" muddles our ability to see it for what it is, and hinders a rational debate about policy and regulation.
Sharing Economy firms carefully select other terms to elicit specific responses. For example, in the 2015 campaign to defeat San Francisco's Proposition F, which sought to limit Airbnb rentals to seventy-five days a year and increase enforcement and penalties of licensing requirements, Airbnb consistently used the term "home sharing" to refer to its activities. 59 And hosts were presumably encouraged to use the term "home sharer" when they testified about how Airbnb helped them make ends meet, despite the fact that over 30% of Airbnb revenue in San Francisco comes from commercial listings.
60
The terms "home sharer" and "home sharing" are used throughout Airbnb press releases and policy materials.
61
Uber is also careful with its word choice. 57 See Aloni, supra note 15, at 1406-08 (discussing how the term "Sharing Economy" is a misnomer because people participate in the Sharing Economy for self-interested reasons); Giana M. Eckhardt & Fleura Bardhi, The Sharing Economy Isn't About Sharing at All, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 28, 2015), https://hbr.org/ 2015/01/the-sharing-economy-isnt-about-sharing-at-all (discussing how the Sharing Economy is not about sharing, it is about access to goods and services); Alex Hern, Why the Term "Sharing Economy" Needs to Die, GUARDIAN (Oct. 5, 2015, 4:43 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/oct/05/why-the-termsharing-economy-needs-to-die (arguing that the term "Sharing Economy" is "actively obfuscatory, lumping together a hugely disparate bunch of companies, many of which push the definition to its limits, and the biggest examples of which have nothing to do with 'sharing' at all"). 58 Lobel, supra note 15, at 89 (listing out the various names given to the Sharing Economy). Instead of simply using the word "driver," Uber uses the term "driver partner."
62
This strategic parsing of words ensures that drivers are viewed as independent contractors and not employees. 63 Platforms are skilled at using words that help them obfuscate their true characteristics and present them in a favorable light.
Frames
Framing involves "selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution." 64 Speakers who succeed in defining the boundaries of an issue can shape public opinion and ultimately influence policy decisions. 65 For example, people's opinions concerning a potential Ku Klux Klan rally can be heavily influenced by whether the issue is framed as one of free speech or of public safety.
66
As Dennis Chong argues, the "essence of public opinion formation" generally relies on framing.
67
Examples of how advocates and policymakers use framing are plentiful.
68
Take for instance the "War on Terrorism" frame, which emerged after the September 11 attacks, and allowed policymakers to shape the debate about privacy and military spending issues in terms of war and national security. The importance of framing can be seen in a variety of "issues such as campaign finance (free speech or democratic corruption?), abortion (rights of mother or rights of unborn child?), gun control (right to bear arms or public safety?), affirmative action (reverse discrimination or remedial action?), welfare policy (humanitarianism or overspending?), hate group rallies (free speech or public safety?)." James N. there is ambiguity about the right course of action and people often are looking for ways to easily understand the situation and form opinions.
70
Framing issues is a common, useful, and effective rhetorical tool. However, policymakers and constituents should question frames that are manipulative in the sense that they prompt people to form opinions that go against their values and self-interests, or prompt people to form opinions that differ from what their opinions would be with complete information.
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In the sections below, this Article identifies five frames commonly used by Sharing Economy Platforms. These frames have helped Platforms mobilize proponents, demobilize opponents, and avoid burdensome regulations. In part, as a result of these frames, numerous market failures have been left unaddressed; thus, they present a good opportunity to examine the manipulative effect of framing on regulating innovation.
a. The Excess Capacity Frame
"Excess capacity" is a manufacturing term used to refer to an underutilized asset.
72
Sharing Economy Platforms assert that they help unlock the excess capacity people have in their underutilized things (homes, schedules, etc.), and indeed, Platforms do allow that unlocking to a degree. 73 However, many participants in the Sharing Economy are not using their excess capacity, or resurrecting "dead capital"; pay for regular household expenses. Similarly, Lending Club and Prosper, which both launched as Facebook applications aimed at "democratizing finance," initially relied on social networks and the trust they engendered to attract borrowers and lenders. 79 At first, the businesses avoided federal and state banking regulations to develop the traction necessary to pursue venture capital funds; Lending Club claimed it provided "affordable funding alternatives to the masses": a "worthy goal." Framing the Sharing Economy in the context of sharing excess supply-side capacity is disingenuous. Most of the time, users are not utilizing their excess capacity; instead, they are using Platforms to market their newly acquired property or full-time services for a profit, but Platforms shy away from exposing that part of the picture. Focusing on the small scale and efficient use of time, space, and property is, in part, what encourages regulators to take a hands-off approach, and allows Platforms to grow without any real restraint. 84 
b. The Microentrepreneur Frame
Related to the excess capacity frame is the middle-class, microentrepreneur frame. This frame has two distinct boundaries. The first relates to the extent to which supply-side users utilize Platforms. The second relates to the classification of these supply-side users as independent contractors as opposed to employees. As this section demonstrates, some supply-side users tip more easily into the full-fledged business side of the spectrum (as opposed to microentrepreneurs), and others are more entrenched in, controlled by, and dependent on Platforms, which pushes them into the employee side of the spectrum. Either way, very few supply-side users are truly independent contractors who earn small amounts of extra "money by providing [their] skills, time or property." For example, an Anchorage, Alaska assembly person stated that he sees "Uber and Lyft as independent companies that cater much more to drivers who occasionally use their personal vehicles for the companies to supplement income," and that measures to regulate Uber and Lyft like taxis would "destroy" this income-generating alternative. Devin Kelly, Uber and Lyft get Anchorage Assembly's OK, but the Companies are Awaiting State Action, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.adn.com/alaskanews/anchorage/2017/03/21/assembly-allows-uber-and-lyft-in-anchorage-but-those-ride-booking-companiesare-awaiting-state-action/. 
i. Full-Fledged Businesses
Platforms employ the middle-class, microentrepreneur frame to reinforce the notion that participants on their Platforms are microentrepreneurs "struggling to pay the bills" or "transitioning between jobs." 86 Via these microbusinesses, users offer the little excess capacity they have for sale, and they, as managers, assume responsibility for all parts of the business that are not outsourced to the Platforms. 87 Since margins are so thin for these hardworking, middle-class microentrepreneurs, and resources are so limited, Platforms argue that they must not be overly burdened by regulations. Chris Lehane of Airbnb put it bluntly:
Cities recognize where the world is going, right, they understand that you're either going to go forward or you're going to go backward . . . . They understand that in a time of economic inequality, this is a question of whose side are you on: Do you want to be on the side of the middle class, or do you want to be opposed to the middle class? 88 Nevertheless, a growing portion of some Platforms' revenue comes from fullfledged businesses that can be burdened by existing regulatory regimes.
89
As previously mentioned, much of Airbnb's revenue in major cities is generated by people running full-time rentals without complying with various regulations, such as taxes and health and safety requirements. Airbnb's Brian Chesky created a photo essay called the "Shared City," which stated, "Imagine if you could build a city that is shared. Where people become micro-entrepreneurs, and local mom and pops flourish once again. Imagine a city that fosters community, where space isn't wasted, but shared with others." Brian Chesky, Shared City, MEDIUM (Mar. 26, 2014), https://medium.com/@bchesky/shared-city-db9746750a3a. In an information sheet created by the political lobbying organization of which Airbnb, Lyft, and Uber are members, the Internet Association stated: "Through the Sharing Economy, microentrepreneurs are able to work for themselves and control their own schedules to earn extra income." INTERNET ASS'N, THE SHARING ECONOMY 1 (2016), https://internetassociation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/SharingEcon2Pager5.pdf. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text; Stulberg, supra note 60, (citing a study that found that almost half of Airbnb revenue in Los Angeles and Honolulu comes from full-time listings).
is therefore more than "a people-to-people platform and a lifeline for people who need supplemental income." 91 Likewise, other Platforms like EatWithwhich match diners and home chefs for meals-attract and sustain professional, full-time supply-side users. 92 
ii. Platform Employees
Platforms utilize the microentrepreneur frame to classify their supply-side users as independent contractors as opposed to employees. 93 For example, on a sign-up page for drivers, Uber stated: "Drive with Uber and earn great money as an independent contractor. Get paid weekly just for helping our community of riders get rides around town. Be your own boss and get paid in fares for driving on your own schedule." 94 Uber's spokesman confirmed that drivers are "independent contractors" when he stated: "We don't hire drivers. We're a technology company. We provide the app that they use, that connects passengers with drivers. They have the flexibility of being their own boss." 95 By claiming that supply-side users are independent contractors, Uber avoids a myriad of employment laws and liability for supply-side user harms.
However, the distinction between independent contractors and employees for drivers is not as clear as Uber would like it to be. While drivers are flexible as to when they can work, Uber does instruct drivers on many aspects of the service, including the condition of the driver ' Uber can also deactivate drivers if their passenger ratings fall below a particular target. 99 Because control is the most important factor in major tests for distinguishing between employees and independent contractors, Uber drivers begin to look more like employees. 100 Furthermore, while Uber claims that over half of its drivers worked for Uber fewer than nine hours per week, 101 much of its revenue comes from fulltime drivers.
102
As UCLA law professor Noah Zatz points out, based on a report written in part by an Uber executive, a "marginal group of full-time drivers actually are doing about half the work, far more than those driving the fewest hours." 103 These workers are likely to be economically dependent on Uber for their livelihood, thereby satisfying the "economic realities" test used by federal courts in cases involving the Fair Labor Standards Act. 104 The classification of drivers as employees has been confirmed by several governmental agencies, 105 and courts have refused to find Uber and Lyft drivers to be independent contractors as a matter of law.
106
Regardless of 98 Id. (describing how Uber sets the rates for drivers). whether a supply-side user is an employee or a full-fledged business, many of the most profitable users for the Platform are not simply microentrepreneurs. Classifying users as microentrepreneurs in name only allows businesses to initially escape regulatory requirements, which is both unfair and dangerous.
c. The "Tech" Company Frame
Running in tandem with the microentrepreneur frame is the "tech" company frame. By defining themselves by what they are not, (i.e., not transportation, accommodation, food companies, etc.), Platforms seek to avoid responsibility for compliance with a broad range of state and federal laws, themselves.
109
As founder and former Uber CEO, Travis Kalanick consistently stated, Uber is a "technology platform that connects riders and drivers."
110
The tech company frame also allows Platforms to hide behind federal law that immunizes Internet companies from liability for improper user behavior. Based on their self-defined status as purely online actors, Platforms argue they are interactive computer service providers (ICSP) under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA), which means they cannot "be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided" by users of their Platforms.
111
The CDA is a 1996 law originally motivated by a desire to encourage ICSPs to moderate user-provided content without fear of being considered "publishers" responsible for defamation claims 112 and by a desire to halt efforts by ICSPs to unjustifiably over-censor user content based on similar liability concerns.
113
However, over the decades since its enactment, it has been broadly interpreted and has moved well beyond protecting ICSPs from liability for defamation. Its immunity now protects ICSPs (broadly defined) 114 from a wide array of claims ranging from defamation to negligence. . According to the CDA, an "interactive computer service provider" is "any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server." Id. § 230(f)(2). The law also provides immunity for liability that results from "any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider . . . considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected." Id. § 230(c)(2)(A); see also Lobel, supra note 15, at 145 (explaining that technology companies such as Uber and Airbnb "are arguing that they fall under the definition of the Act, which thereby protects them from civil liability").
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Anthony Ciolli, Chilling Effects: The Communications Decency Act and the Online Marketplace of Ideas, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 137, 148 (2008) (describing how conservative members of congress were afraid that intermediaries would have "a strong incentive to never exercise editorial control, thus increasing the risk that children and others would be exposed to highly offensive or inappropriate Internet content"). 113 Id. ("Such over-censorship could ruin the Internet's potential as a vibrant marketplace for the exchange of ideas, as ideas that may offend even just one individual might be removed by an Internet intermediary fearing litigation.").
114
Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that an ICSP can include "'any' information services or other systems, as long as the service or system allows 'multiple users' to access 'a computer server'"). The CDA has been used by Platforms as a regulatory shield. For example, based on Section 230 immunity, Airbnb convinced the City of Anaheim, California not to impose penalties on the company for facilitating illegal rentals. 116 Airbnb also filed multiple lawsuits against regulations on short-term rentals asserting that the CDA protects them.
117
And Airbnb typically only agrees to drop the lawsuits when the jurisdictions agree that the Platform will not be held responsible for the illegal listings.
118
The CDA could also be used as a shield against responsibility for harm caused by Platform users. While Platforms have not directly asserted a CDA defense in public litigation, many people, including the general counsel for Lyft, are of the opinion that Platforms would or should be protected. 
d. The Self-Regulation Frame
According to Airbnb's founder and CEO Brian Chesky, Sharing Economy Platforms have these "magical things called reputation systems." 121 He argues that these systems can screen out bad behavior better than governments can, and that the "government should exist as the place of last recourse." 122 Uber argues that its "rating system works to make sure that the most respectful riders and drivers are using Uber." The purpose of a reputation system is to allow users "to correctly infer the likelihood" of a positive interaction without having any prior experience with the user on the other side.
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Reputation systems rely on three basic assumptions to predict future performance: "(1) reputation information accurately represents the quality of past transactions; (2) the reputation system cannot be manipulated by fraudulent reviews or irrelevant information; and (3) users accurately interpret reputation information."
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Each of these assumptions may be at times incorrect, which "could lead consumers down frustrating and potentially dangerous paths." 
stars (out of five). 129
This over-inflation is likely to do with the personal nature of Sharing Economy transactions, which trigger several well-documented cognitive biases that inflate reviews.
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These biases include the reporting bias, which causes people to provide reviews for extremely good transactions more frequently than mediocre ones; 131 the fear of retaliation, which causes people to avoid giving negative reviews out of a fear that they will be punished; 132 and the herding effect, which causes people to provide inflated reviews if they see prior positive reviews. 133 Second, while Platforms take measures to prevent review manipulation, for example by allowing only parties who have actually had an interaction to review one another, confederate and other forms of fake reviews still exist on Platforms. 134 In addition, irrelevant information about the transaction or user can make systems inaccurate. This irrelevant information can come in one of two ways: (1) from external sources, such as an Uber passenger giving a fivestar review because the weather was nice and there was little traffic despite poor service by a driver, or (2) from the algorithms that Platforms incorporate into their reputation systems that analyze large swaths of user information. These algorithms may utilize inputs that have nothing to do with the quality of the user. For example, the neighborhood where a Lending Club applicant lives may impair that applicant's ability to get a loan despite her ability to pay. 135 And finally, the way review information is presented can confuse users, which can lead to inaccurate interpretations of review data. 136 For example, people tend to rely more on the overall score of a user (e.g., 4.7 stars out of 5) than the weight of the score. This means a user with a 4.7 stars out of 5 based on three reviews might be preferred by a user over an individual with 4.6 stars based on three-hundred reviews.
Reputation systems are an excellent way to capture information about transactions and encourage users to act responsibly. However, they are not 129 See Nairi, Feedback Is a Two-Way Street, UBER NEWSROOM (Apr. 24, 2014), https://newsroom.uber. com/2014/04/feedback-is-a-2-way-street/. without their faults. When reviews are overly positive, false, or difficult to understand, the utility of reputation systems to self-regulate Platforms is diminished. Therefore, regulators should not overly rely on the premise that these systems can magically replace the need for various forms of regulation.
e. Innovation Frame
Similar to the self-regulation frame, Sharing Economy Platforms claim that they are disrupting existing industries by offering new ways to solve problems.
137
This self-proclaimed positioning in the market allows them to portray themselves as innovative and their competition as stagnant rent-seeking incumbents.
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As the Washington Post opinion writer Roger Cohen writes, "Uber manage[s] to cast itself as progress incarnate and the taxi industry as a bunch of thick-headed peasants who didn't know that its time had passed." Schneiderman's op-ed, Uber's head of global public policy wrote that "New York has always been at the forefront of personal empowerment and innovation, and we hope that leaders here recognize how troubling it would be to lag behind the rest of the world").
Driving Innovation at Uber, UBER (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.uber.com/en-PK/blog/innovation/ ("Innovation is in our DNA at Uber."); SLEE, supra note 2, at 127. Companies exploit legal gray areas to argue that existing rules do not apply to them. Pollman & Barry, supra note 17, at 398-400 ("Even if existing regulations or statutes use broad language that, when read literally, prohibit the company's activity, the company can take the view that officials were not considering the company's activity when they wrote those rules-how could they, when the technology the business is built on did not yet exist?"); see also Lobel, supra note 15, at 116 (describing an "overarching ethos of newness, innovation, and empowerment" among Platform companies).
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For example, the California Public Utilities Commission adopted a specific set of rules to govern Transportation Network Company services to protect public safety while "encouraging innovation and utilization of technology to better the lives of Californians." Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, Decision Adopting Rules and Regulations to Protect Public Safety While Allowing New Entrants to the Transportation Industry: Rulemaking No. 12-12-011 (July 30, 2013), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M077/ K112/77112285.PDF.
one of the first real, purpose-built innovations in an industry that hasn't seen much innovation for decades."
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Taken as a whole, the Myth of the Sharing Economy encourages people to believe that the Sharing Economy is made up of self-regulating Platforms that encourage microentrepreneurs to utilize their excess capacity in an altruistic manner. As described in the next Part, the seductive appeal of this Myth allows regulators to make sense of the novel, technology-driven business practices of platforms, while preventing them from truly understanding the nature of these companies and by extension how to regulate them.
II. DEMYSTIFYING THE MYTH
In the early stages of the Sharing Economy (roughly 2006 to 2014), most jurisdictions simply let the issue of regulation play out.
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Survey reports from 2014 show that twenty-five of the thirty most populous cities in the United States had yet to enact home-sharing regulations, 144 and only thirteen of the fifty most populous cities in the United States had taken action in the form of cease-and-desist letters to stop ride-sharing apps (and in many places these were ignored).
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The rest either turned a blind eye or began to implement regulation tailored to the Platforms. While it is impossible to control for the various variables that led to this hands-off regulatory approach, based on the evidence provided in Part I, rhetoric clearly played a part.
Lack of regulation would not be a problem if the scale of the Sharing Economy were not so large-that is if the Sharing Economy just consisted of ordinary people sharing their "little bit" of excess capacity. However, we know that the Sharing Economy is motivated by profit, not altruism. We know that people are putting new capacity online, not simply utilizing what they already have. And we know that many supply-side users are likely either employees or full-fledged, illegal businesses, not microenterprises. The size and impact of the Sharing Economy (mostly through its two main players, Airbnb and Uber) present real harms to society. These harms manifest themselves as market failures, which the following section surveys. The section concludes by demonstrating how under-regulation of these market failures, has allowed a few Platforms to grow exponentially.
A. Market Failures in the Sharing Economy
According to the public-interest theory of regulation, markets generally put scarce resources to their highest and best use. 146 However, regulatory intervention may be necessary when the pricing system alone cannot efficiently allocate resources.
147
In these situations, market failures occur, and in the Sharing Economy, in particular, they occur in two main ways-clean and messy. 
Clean Market Failures
Clean market failures are those capable of being addressed quickly through the design of Platforms and the internalization of costs. These market failures include, but are not limited to: asymmetric information, discrimination, some forms of negative externalities, and the provision of public goods.
Asymmetric information occurs when a party has exclusive information about the quality of a transaction.
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Reputation systems help reduce asymmetric information, but they can be improved to prevent the disappointment and fraud that still occurs on platforms. regulators could require platforms to simultaneously reveal feedback. Under such a system, feedback would only be available after both users provide it or after a set period of time. Thus, the fear of retaliation would be reduced and reviews would be more accurate.
Discrimination occurs throughout the Sharing Economy.
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For example, Airbnb guests with African-American sounding names are significantly less likely to have a reservation request accepted than guests with white-sounding names.
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To reduce discrimination, Airbnb now encourages instant booking so hosts cannot review reservation requests.
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Other design choices, such as reducing the prominence of pictures and names, can be used to further reduce discrimination by removing opportunities to make decisions based on discriminatory characteristics.
Regulations can also force Platforms to internalize many of the costs they have avoided, especially those related to ensuring safety via direct and vicarious liability.
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California law, for example, requires transportation network companies (TNC) to have a zero-tolerance policy for drunk driving. 155 If a drunk-driving complaint is received by a TNC, it must suspend the driver until further investigation. 156 When TNCs do not comply, they face fines. 157 Furthermore, if tort liability is shifted to Platforms while users are using www.airbnb.com (last visited Aug. 24, 2017). Note that the complaints on www.AirbnbHell.com are unverified. Platform services, Platforms will have a greater incentive to prevent harms through broader background checks and safety inspections.
Each year, Platforms avoid reporting and collecting millions of dollars in tax revenues to all levels of government. 158 Consequently, public goods such as roads, parks, and law enforcement may be underfunded. However, as suggested by the fact that Airbnb remits over $110 million in taxes in over 200 jurisdictions, Platforms can collect taxes with relative ease.
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While clean market failures within the Sharing Economy are more straightforward to address than messy market failures, regulation has still been piecemeal. 160 Thus unsurprisingly, consumers have been defrauded, discriminated against, and injured within the sharing economy, and taxes, which finance public goods, have gone unpaid.
Messy Market Failures
Messy market failures are far harder to address than clean market failures. This is because some of these market failures are ambiguous and not readily apparent (e.g., environmental and community harms); some must be addressed beyond the local level of government (e.g., privacy harms); and others may be indirect (e.g., economic harms).
a. Ambiguous Harms
While Platforms present themselves as good community members and ecofriendly businesses, they can cause unintended yet broad harms to communities and the environment. For example, accommodation Platforms' disregard for zoning and licensing requirements can go well beyond nuisance harms, as demonstrated by the horror stories listed on sites like www.AirbnbHell.com. 161 They can impact the affordability of housing 162 and the culture of communities.
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The environmental impacts associated with the Sharing Economy are equally complex. Despite widespread beliefs that the Sharing Economy is reducing the demand for new goods and spaces, apart from research on carsharing, there is no empirical evidence that these beliefs are true. 164 To the contrary, a study by Rayle et al. interviewed two groups of people in three neighborhoods in San Francisco: (1) individuals who had just completed a ride with Uber/Lyft and (2) individuals who had used Uber/Lyft within the previous two weeks. 165 They asked, among other things, how the individual would have traveled had Uber/Lyft not been available. 166 They found a small "(8%) induced travel effect," suggesting that the presence of Uber/Lyft leads to rides that would otherwise not have taken place. 167 Furthermore, for those who would have made the trip in the absence of Uber/Lyft, 33% of respondents said that they would have used a bus or rail, which are typically more environmentally friendly forms of transportation. Id. at 6-12. 167 Id. at 13. 168 Id.
from a simple "click away." 169 As described below, the network and data network effects will only allow a few players to emerge in each modality, thus competition is limited. 170 Second, Platforms, like Uber, are able to unilaterally set prices (including surge prices) for all supply-side users. These activities have been challenged as unreasonable restraints on trade under the Sherman Act, 171 but are yet to be resolved because Uber now insists on submitting the dispute to arbitration.
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How regulators should address the harms caused by the Sharing Economy to the vibrancy and diversity of communities, the environment, and markets is a very open question, primarily because we have yet to see how those harms will manifest over time.
b. Beyond Local Regulation
Certain market failures are inappropriate for purely local regulation. For example, due in large part to their classification as independent contractors, which reduces employment security and benefits, many Sharing Economy workers are part of a "precariat class."
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Local jurisdictions alone cannot provide for the social services to aid these workers in times of need or when they relocate.
Furthermore, because Platforms connect people from different places, gather large amounts of user data, and store information remotely, harms related to privacy are magnified across borders. Currently, Platforms use contract law to dictate privacy protections, or lack thereof, but abuse still occurs. to its "God View" with attendees of a launch event. 175 The God View showed the whereabouts of notable users.
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In response, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) stepped in and filed a complaint against Uber, asserting that the company violated Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce."
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Uber and the FTC later settled, 178 but still the program demonstrates how technology companies have the ability to decimate individual privacy and why the response to privacy harms cannot be piecemeal.
c. Indirect Harms
When the Sharing Economy first took off, the economic effects were expected to be incredibly positive, and to some degree they have been.
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A recent study using almost fifty million individual-level observations of Uber riders estimated that the service generated approximately $6.8 billion in consumer surplus in the United States in 2015, meaning that consumers are enjoying a large degree of the value created by the service.
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However, "the distribution of increased income and welfare are likely to be uneven." 181 This is in no small part because supply-side users are more likely affluent to begin with (they are the ones who already have fancy cars and second homes next to beautiful beaches).
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The Sharing Economy simply gives this group the ability to make more off of what they have or invest in new assets to make even more money, a process identified as the "Piketty-effect" of the Sharing Economy. In the end, it is predicted that the wealthier supply-side users will crowd out the work opportunities typically completed by lower-educated, manual laborers.
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Existing firms and their employees are also likely to experience lower earnings in response to the public's desire to take advantage of lower-cost transactions in the Sharing Economy. 185 One study found that the revenue of hotels in Texas reduced significantly as Airbnb grew in that state. 186 Another found that in New York City, traditional cab rides were reduced by 2.1 million rides in the same time period that the number of Uber rides jumped from 300,000 to 3.5 million.
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While it is not the role of government to protect existing industries at the expense of innovation, new firms must not be allowed to unfairly escape all forms of costly regulation.
Messy regulatory failures will require open and thoughtful debate to address, but as demonstrated below, because Platforms are relatively unregulated in the startup stages, network effects will allow a few to grow very powerful. These powerful firms will then use their vast arsenal of users and cash to avoid addressing both clean and messy market failures.
B. The Breeding Grounds for Unicorns
The Sharing Economy appears to present a diverse set of Platforms-from clothes sharing to pet sitting-but this is not an entirely accurate picture. In reality, the Sharing Economy is mostly comprised of only a few firms.
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And despite popular belief, the Sharing Economy as a whole is not growing by leaps and bounds. Yes, there has been an incredible influx of Uber-like businesses receiving venture capital investments, but the true success stories of the Sharing Economy are few and far between. Tracking the 154 companies identified on Jeremiah Owyang's (founder of the brand council Crowd Companies) master list of Sharing Economy companies in 2013, 190 fewer than 60% of those companies survived until 2016.
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Of those, fewer than ten were still functioning as successful, standalone companies with a value of over $1 million in 2016. Over twenty-five were acquired, and the rest have experienced a minimal amount of success or failure.
Many academic papers about the Sharing Economy mention other Sharing Economy Platforms such as TaskRabbit, 192 HomeJoy, 193 and DogVacay, 194 without delving into great detail about the companies themselves because they have only seen limited success, if they have seen success at all. The network and data network effects can, in part, explain this phenomenon. A standard network effect involves a situation in which a service becomes more valuable the more people use it.
195
Credit card companies are a well-known example; the more people who use a particular card (American Express, Visa, etc.), the more sellers will begin to accept that card and the more buyers will, in turn, use that card more often. Economy companies, were not tracked. This is because these companies did not appear to be capitalizing on the excess capacity of microentrepreneurs and thus did not appear to be Sharing Economy companies. Examples include commercial car rental services such as Car2Go and textbook, fashion, and art rental companies. Furthermore, there was no available data for several of the companies. Therefore, they were excluded. See How It Works, ROVER, https://www.rover.com/become-a-sitter/ (explaining that DogVacay was a pet-sitting service provider that recently merged with Rover, a dog-sitting service provider) (last visited Sept. 3, 2017). Economy: competition is reduced because the more people use a particular Platform, the more people want to use that Platform.
Furthermore, data network effects work in a similar way. The more users that provide data to a system, the more efficient the system becomes, typically through machine learning. 197 Sharing Economy platforms have benefited enormously from the data network effect to provide a seamless user experience via fine-tuned matching algorithms and iterative quality improvements. 198 Thus, compounding these network effects is the fact that dominant Sharing Economy firms often acquire their competition or prospective competition.
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For example, Trip4Real, a Platform that allows users to connect with locals (for a fee) for events like tours, cooking classes, and photo shoots, was acquired by Airbnb in 2016. 200 And in China there was a heated battle in the ride-sharing space between Didi Chuxing and Uber China. Uber China ultimately sold to Didi Chuxing due to the winner-takes-all nature of Platforms. 201 The limited success enjoyed by the vast majority of Sharing Economy Platforms is also likely because self-interest drives business. Successful Sharing Economy startups are often "those that get in early" and appeal to "consumers' laziness and desire to save money [rather] than their actual desire to share and be green." 202 As a result, the companies built around sharing tools, bikes, cars, and pets are usually more hassle than they are worth for consumers. The Sharing Economy is not a wide-open realm of opportunity; thus, we must observe the Unicorns carefully in order to regulate them, paying more attention to what they do than what they say.
III. UNICORN MAGIC: HOW SHARING ECONOMY PLATFORMS MAKE THEIR OWN RULES
As demonstrated in the Parts above: Sharing Economy firms use rhetoric to avoid regulation. Some grow powerful, and those dominant players, the Unicorns, work their magic to fend off burdensome regulation and write their own rules. This Part describes how Unicorns accomplish their particular form of "magic."
Unicorns are able to avoid regulation and dictate the rules that will govern them in traditional and nontraditional ways. On the traditional side, once the Unicorns acquire venture capital and begin generating revenue, they can buy advertising, armies of lobbyists, and commission studies from prominent politicians and academics to write favorable reports in support of their activities. 203 For example, as of 2014, Uber had at least a third more lobbyists than Wal-Mart (not including municipal lobbyists).
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Uber's founder and former CEO, Travis Kalanick once said, "[W]e are running a political campaign and the Candidate is Uber. . . . And this political race is happening in every major city in the world. And because this isn't about a democracy, this is about a product, you can't win 51 to 49. You have to win 98 to 2." 205 Perhaps more concerning than Unicorns' capacity to flex their muscles through spending, however, is their ability to outmuscle and outsmart governments by mobilizing their powerful user base. 206 California, Lyft used a company called Phone2Action to send e-mails and manipulate the Lyft interface to help people contact their elected officials.
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From e-mails alone, Lyft was able to get a staggering 28% conversion rate (compared to the normal 2% response rate for advocacy e-mails). 208 The bills either failed or were modified to the ride sharing company's satisfaction. 209 Platforms advocate hard by utilizing atypical yet effective tactics ranging from Twitter campaigns to ice cream deliveries as a way of pressuring cities to adopt industry-friendly regulations. 210 For example, when New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio proposed legislation that would limit the number of ridesharing vehicles in the City, Uber responded by adding a "de Blasio" mode to its app. 211 The mode showed users the long wait times and car unavailability they would be subject to if the legislation passed.
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The company's gambit succeeded and the City stopped pursuing the cap proposal. 213 This new form of "Platform advocacy" or "new power" allows large groups to collectively influence lawmakers. 214 Platforms are masters at harnessing and nurturing that power. The problem, however, is oversimplification. By controlling the terms of engagement and frames, Sharing Economy companies do not seek to facilitate debate around nuanced and emerging issues. Their self-interest inspires them to present the same onesided narratives used to influence regulators, and their user base gets behind that message, even if they are ultimately hurt by the hands-off regulatory approach. 207 Furthermore, if regulations are imposed, Unicorns will work to make sure the regulations are not overly burdensome, preferring to pull out of a jurisdiction rather than submit to a series of regulations that address clean and messy market failures. 215 This is clear in the many jurisdictions that recognize Uber and Lyft as transportation network companies and have adopted specific, although light-in-touch, ordinances for them. 216 As reporter Karen Weise puts it, "Each government, whether municipal or state, goes through its own process to craft rules, but in the end, officials generally codify the insurance coverage, background-check policies, and inspection protocols Uber [and Lyft] already have in place. Uber makes the rules; cities fall in line." 217 The same is true for Airbnb. In the jurisdictions where the Platform is regulated, special rules have been crafted to treat the industry differently than traditional hotels. 218 Airbnb has even produced a thirty-plus page "Tool Chest" for regulators to make sure any regulations are "smart," with the implied understanding that it is considered "smart" to allow "home sharing" to flourish. 219 However, other than tax collection, few jurisdictions place legal responsibility on Airbnb for facilitating illegal rentals. 220 
IV. LESSONS FROM THE SHARING ECONOMY "REVOLUTION" 215
Rhetoric has driven regulatory agendas throughout history-from securities regulation to gun control and tax law. 221 In the Sharing Economy, it is no different, especially in the formative stages. Successful Sharing Economy Platforms have learned how to employ rhetoric to avoid the expense of ensuring safety, providing universal access, and treating supply-side users as employees, among other things. However, what makes this application of rhetoric most concerning is the concentration of power inherent in these firms. By ignoring the rules that would traditionally govern their activities, Platforms can grow more and more powerful. 222 Therefore, regulators need to heed the following lessons to effectively regulate future network technologies.
A. Acknowledge the Knowledge Gap Between the Regulators and the Regulated
In modern times, there is a growing knowledge gap between the regulated and the regulators. Sharing Economy companies, in particular, utilize sophisticated Internet-based technologies that regulators are at a loss to fully understand, much less question. Regulators need to acknowledge their lack of expertise and bring industry stakeholders to the table to better understand the nature of these new businesses.
Regulators may be well served to see through the rhetoric, address the technology gap, and encourage innovation by embracing the principles of the New Governance theory. ways to best achieve those goals. 224 As soon as regulators become aware of new innovations, especially those that rely on network effects, they should encourage key stakeholders to come to the table and begin a dialogue early about potential regulatory problems and solutions. Coming quickly up to speed about new business models will allow regulators to more easily see past rhetoric and prevent market failures.
B. Be Not Afraid of the CDA
The CDA has been credited as the law that helped the "revolutionary growth" of the Internet because it removed the threat of litigation resulting from third-party behavior. 225 Without the protection of the CDA, it is unlikely that we would have robust platforms such as Google, Facebook, and Twitter. 226 However, regulators should not self-censor when it comes to the CDA. There is a growing body of scholarship and case law that suggests the CDA as it applies to the Sharing Economy may not completely immunize it from liability for user behavior or prevent it from being regulated.
and it requires hosts renting out their entire homes to register with the city. 229 However, more than a year after the law took effect, only 25% of Airbnb hosts required to register had done so. 230 "San Francisco's Budget and Legislative Analyst's Office reported that enforcement of the registration requirement was 'hampered by the City's lack of information' because short-term rentals 'operate in private residences without any commercial signage posted' and because hosting platforms 'do not disclose addresses or booking information about their hosts.'" 231 As stated by David Campos, a Board of Supervisors member, "Airbnb is proving that it wants to play by its own rules, that it believes . . . it is entitled to something no business has, absolute freedom to operate free of responsibility and oversight . . . . It's their way or the highway." 232 In response, San Francisco enacted Ordinance 104-16, which amended the original Airbnb Law (Original Modification) to require Airbnb and others like it to monitor and verify user information or face civil and criminal penalties. 233 Airbnb and Homeway (a Platform similar to Airbnb) promptly filed a lawsuit in response the Original Modification, claiming it violated Section 230, and moved for a preliminary injunction. 234 The city changed the Original Modification via Ordinance 178-16 (Updated Modification) and abandoned any requirement or restrictions on the publication of rental listings, which more squarely fit within the purview of the CDA. 235 Airbnb and Homeaway argued, however, that the ordinance still "squarely violates Section 230 by imposing liability on Hosting Platforms for third-party transactions that directly result from their publication of third-party listings." Judge Donato, the United States District Judge hearing the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction, disagreed.
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For Section 230 immunity to apply, a law must "inherently require[] the court to treat" a provider of an interactive computer service as "the 'publisher or speaker' of content provided by another." 238 Judge Donato found that in no way did the Updated Modification "treat[] plaintiffs as the publishers or speakers of the rental listings provided by hosts. It does not regulate what can or cannot be said or posted in the listings. It creates no obligation on plaintiffs' part to monitor, edit, withdraw or block the content supplied by hosts." 239 Judge Donato's argument has raised eyebrows among technology scholars who find his distinction to be one without a difference. "If a[] rental advertising service is structured as a marketplace, it makes no sense to display listings for services that can't be purchased," writes Santa Clara law professor Eric Goldman. 240 Regardless, it is clear that the CDA may be losing its power. As stated in a court opinion in another CDA case related to a roommate matching site, "[t]he [CDA] was not meant to create a lawless no-man's-land on the Internet."
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Regulators should not allow their actions to be governed by fear that the CDA will nullify all regulations that impact Platforms, especially regulations that do not directly regulate the publication of information, but instead regulate Platforms' ability to profit from undesirable transactions.
Lastly, as Platforms expand their offerings, utilizing Section 230 immunity will become virtually impossible. Uber states that its mission is "to make transportation as reliable as running water-everywhere and for everyone." 242 moment Uber can no longer call itself just a technology company. 244 Regulators should stay clear-eyed and avoid the tech company frame and the allure of Internet exceptionalism-the notion that the Internet is inherently different and thus needs special legal treatment-to tackle the market failures presented by such innovations.
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C. Stay Focused on the Ends and Not the Means of Regulation
Sharing Economy Platforms are disrupters because they help provide wants and needs-transportation, accommodation, access to capital, etc.-in cheaper and more efficient ways. When Platforms disrupt existing ways of doing things, regulators should be open to the idea that these new ways can sometimes achieve the desired ends of regulation. As Orly Lobel writes, innovative firms provide new ways to address some of the very same social goals that law has attempted to reach. We are accustomed to thinking in terms of a new industry followed by a new set of regulations, but market innovation also offers an opportunity for more foundational thinking about the role of regulation.
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Regulators should embrace new ideas and ways to solve problems; however, as previously discussed, they should also avoid blind reliance on new innovations to address market failures. For example, innovations like reputation systems, while perhaps more effective than licensing requirements, are not perfect and should not be treated as such.
In adherence to New Governance principals, regulators should try to incorporate a decentralized stakeholder group to create performance standards. Performance standards focus on the ends rather than the means of regulation.
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They specify a desired outcome, but leave the how to the specific regulated entity. Lobel, supra note 15, at 117.
Traditional design standards specify exactly how a regulated entity should achieve compliance in order to address market failures. good example of this. 249 Complaints about drunk TNC drivers must be zero, and TNC platforms must figure out how to achieve that goal. Performancebased standards encourage creativity and flexibility, and allow people closest to the problems to figure out the ways to solve them. 250 The dispute between San Francisco and home-sharing platforms discussed in the previous section also provides good insight into the utility of performance standards. 251 After Airbnb and Homeaway's motion for preliminary injunction was denied, the plaintiffs resumed talks with the city. Eventually, Airbnb and Homeaway agreed to do what they do best: set up an online portal. This portal will allow hosts to easily comply with San Francisco's registration laws, which were previously "impossible" to navigate in many cases. 252 Now, San Francisco is capitalizing on the unique competencies of Platforms to achieve its goal of removing dangerous and illegal hosts from the Platforms.
For performance standards to be effective, they must be monitored. This requires sharing data, which is something Platforms have been loath to do. 253 But, as Platforms are beginning to learn, sharing information is often better than the imposition of legal liability. Case in point is Airbnb's dealings with the City of New Orleans. 254 To operate in the city, Airbnb agreed to share data and let the city enforce registration requirements (aided by a $1-a-night fee collected by Airbnb). 255 intimidation of federal law, focusing on the ends instead of the means of regulation, and articulating the differences and similarities of new and old methods, regulators can avoid the persuasive power of myth and other rhetorical techniques, thereby putting the public interest above the interest of private firms. Awareness will improve regulators' abilities to adopt measured, innovation-friendly approaches to address market failures before companies become too large to regulate easily, if at all.
